The story: Iraq’s push to bring autonomous armed factions under state authority is entering a new phase. The government has so far wanted ‘resistance’ groups to hand in their weapons by the end of September. It now instead wants to gradually integrate individual fighters into official security forces. The eventual fates of parent factions appear unresolved. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has outlined a six-point plan to achieve the objective by next summer.

The coverage: While attending the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Zaidi set out a phased approach to bringing all weapons under state control.

  • Iraq-based +964 Media reported on Sept. 22 that the process would begin with a 90-day halt to attacks after the US-led Coalition mission ends on Sept. 30. Subsequently, there would be a gradual handover of weapons and integration of fighters into state institutions.
  • In a Sept. 21 interview, Zaidi said the plan would see the end of autonomous armed groups by June 30, 2027. Fighters would be allowed to join the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) on an individual basis.

Zaidi has outlined the proposal as part of the wider transition in Iraq’s security relationship with the US.

  • During Zaidi’s Sept. 21 meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the prime minister reaffirmed Baghdad’s commitment to restricting weapons to the state. 
  • US Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq Thomas Barrack subsequently stated on Sept. 22 that Baghdad and Washington had agreed that “by the end of June 2027, the state will be the only entity possessing military force.”


Reactions among Iraqi pundits and media reflect sharply different views of the extension of the disarmament deadline.

  • Writing on Twitter/X, political analyst Imad Al-Musafir welcomed the extension as a political victory for Baghdad, arguing that predictions of an imminent confrontation between the government and ‘resistance’ factions had failed to materialize.

  • UTV’s Zaid Abdulwahab Al-Athami suggested in a post to X that US acceptance of the timeline follows guarantees by Baghdad that American interests will be protected. On the other hand, Athami alleged, Washington has given assurances that armed groups will not be targeted. Notably, Athami warned that renewed regional escalation could undermine such guarantees.

The debate has also centered on what should ultimately happen to the ‘resistance’ factions.

  • Secretary-General of the Iraqi Loyalty Movement Adnan Al-Zurfi maintained that resolving the presence of weapons outside state control requires a political process to dismantle the factions and remove their arms.

  • Veteran politician Izzat Al-Shabandar cast the extension of the deadline in more conciliatory terms, calling it “a golden opportunity” to strengthen state sovereignty.

The context/analysis: Zaidi’s new timeline puts less emphasis on rapidly enforcing state control over weapons and more on finding a politically workable way to achieve it. This also requires separating official security structures from autonomous factions that have built political and organizational influence around them.

  • The PMU emerged in 2014 from largely pre-existing Shiite armed factions following the Islamic State group’s (IS) advance across northern Iraq.
  • In 2016, Baghdad incorporated the PMU into the Iraqi military. The measure formally brought the organization under the umbrella of the Iraqi armed forces, meaning that it would have to report to the prime minister as commander-in-chief.

The formalization of the PMU did not resolve the legal status of the factions within and around it.

  • The ruling Shiite Coordination Framework agreed on May 9 to establish a committee headed by Zaidi, his predecessor Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani (2022–26) and Badr Organization chief Hadi Al-Ameri. The committee is tasked with registering weapons, categorizing armed groups and examining options for integrating fighters into civilian institutions or official security forces.
  • On June 1, the Coordination Framework backed placing weapons under state control while separating the PMU from political structures.

Turning this approach into an arrangement acceptable to the factions proved more difficult for Baghdad.

  • By mid-August, senior Coordination Framework figures were proposing a “weapons management” formula to ‘resistance’ factions including Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, replacing immediate disarmament with weapons regulation.
  • As armed groups attached conditions to any disarmament arrangements, the Sept. 30 deadline increasingly became more untenable.


Disagreements within the Coordination Framework complicated efforts to establish a unified approach, with some armed factions resisting the idea that the ruling political alliance could determine their military status.

  • The debate further widened when Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba demanded that the disarmament drive ought to apply to all armed actors in Iraq. Meanwhile, Kata’ib Hezbollah singled out the Peshmerga, thereby pulling Iraqi Kurdistan into a dispute that had initially centered on Iran-aligned Shiite factions.
  • On Aug. 23, the Coordination Framework linked the passage of the contentious PMU Service and Retirement Law to arrangements for handling faction-held weapons, tying the umbrella force’s future to the wider weapons dispute.

Against this backdrop, Zaidi’s plan to monopolize weapons in the hands of the state by June 2027 appears to formalize a distinction that has been emerging for months: individual fighters can join the PMU, while ‘resistance’ factions would lose their status as autonomous armed entities.

  • If the plan is implemented, one key issue will likely revolve around how the leadership networks and political influence of integrated fighters may be reproduced once they enter the state security apparatus.

The future: Next year’s deadline is likely to shift the focus from the Sept. 30 cutoff to the mechanics of implementation. The longer timeframe should not be assumed to automatically make negotiations with ‘resistance’ factions easier.

  • A Coordination Framework source warned on Sept. 23 that a fixed deadline could disrupt talks with faction leaders.

In the coming months, Baghdad is likely to prioritize weapons registration and personnel integration, while armed groups will probably seek guarantees over the process and their future status.

  • Progress on the PMU Service and Retirement Law may also shape how fighters are incorporated into the umbrella force, and the dynamics of separating the PMU from politics.

The Sept. 30 Coalition withdrawal may remove one major point of contention, but disputes over factional autonomy are likely to persist.

  • The initial 90-day period of Zaidi’s six-point plan, which entails a halt to attacks on Coalition and US interests, could also prove fragile. Any renewed strikes by armed factions could undermine the conditions for implementation and provide grounds to suspend the process.