It is hard to pinpoint precisely when Qais Al-Khazali, the founder of Iraqi armed group Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, may have seen a real chance to lead the country’s Shiite political establishment. For any Iraqi actor to achieve that aim, they would need a genuine partnership with Iran, and through that process, the political space to forge a working relationship with the United States.
Khazali may have seen an opening in the summer of 2023, when he was invited to meet with Iran’s then-supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (1989–2026), in Tehran. The purpose of the meeting, which also gathered other Iraqi ‘resistance’ leaders, was to prepare a coordinated response to potential escalation with Israel and the US. Khazali was instead focused on getting his hosts to help reshuffle the leadership of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). Khazali’s maneuvering did not sit well with Khamenei, nor Quds Force commander Esmail Qa’ani.
A few months later, Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq did not join Iraqi attacks on US forces and Israel amid the Gaza war—staying away from the ‘Unity of Fronts’ strategy that had been discussed in Tehran. That decision, observers say, helped precipitate the emergence of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” where Khazali and his group have no presence. At the same time, Khazali has been careful about being seen as openly distancing himself from Iran. The Islamic Republic has also made an effort to place him in a position of prominence during public events. For instance, during a visit to Tehran in Oct. 2024, he was placed in the row behind Khamenei at Friday prayers—a rare occurrence for foreign leaders.
Those dynamics may have been an opportunity for opponents of Iranian influence in Iraq to invest in a young leader in a Shiite establishment dominated by aging veterans. Given that Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq has been accused of killing US soldiers and been on the State Department's terrorist blacklist for the past six years, it would certainly have been a tough pill for Washington to swallow. And until a few months ago, the Donald Trump administration continued to refuse engagement, reportedly keeping the political wing of Khazali’s group out of the Iraqi government.
But in a reversal, Khazali's brother, Laith, was on Oct. 15 confirmed as deputy prime minister of Iraq with reported US acquiescence. The apparent turnaround has fed talk in Baghdad that the Trump administration might do for the Khazali brothers what it did for Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Like the leader of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, Sharaa also built his career in armed resistance, fighting in Iraq with Al-Qaeda before eventually leading forces that overthrew the Iran-backed Syrian government in Dec. 2024. He has since been warmly welcomed to the White House, greatly due to his focus on ending Iranian influence in the Levant.
Khazali’s challenge to gain US recognition is different, particularly as he has no apparent interest in directly confronting Iran. Yet, forging a working relationship with Washington would likely require him to further distance himself from the Tehran-aligned ecosystem that has enabled his rise. Although it may appear counterintuitive, Iran may not oppose the rise of an Iraqi Shiite leader who can act as a bridge to the United States. More importantly, the presence of an actor such as Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq within the Iraqi government could act as a template for other ‘resistance’ factions to become, rather than having to confront, the Iraqi state.
Rival heirs
Few Shiite armed factions in Iraq have since the 2003 US-led invasion traveled as far as Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq.
The group’s founder studied in Najaf under Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq Al-Sadr, whose assassination in 1999 was widely blamed on former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (1979–2003). In 2006, Khazali founded Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq as an offshoot of the movement led by the ayatollah's son, Shiite cleric and politician Muqtada Al-Sadr. Some analysts say Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) quickly recruited the breakaway faction, while others note that Khazali served as Sadr's channel to Iran following the invasion of Iraq.
Ali Mamouri, a research fellow at Deakin University who advised former Iraqi prime minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi (2020-22), told Amwaj.media that Khazali has sought to establish himself as "the authentic political representative" of the Sadrist Movement. Mamouri explained that "adopting the language of statesmanship serves that ambition, even when his decisions resemble Sadr's."
The Iraqi government’s campaign to monopolize control over arms, which Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi summed up on Sept. 30 as "one weapon in the hands of the state," has become the latest test of Khazali's dynamic with Sadr. On May 27, the latter announced the "complete separation" of Saraya Al-Salam, a Shiite armed group, from his movement and its transfer to state control. Less than a week later, on June 2, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq said it would leave the PMU, a state-funded umbrella force that gathers mainly Shiite factions, and would join other elements of the Iraqi armed forces.
Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq has also built a base at the ballot box. Its political wing, the Sadiqoon bloc, has grown from a single parliamentary seat in 2014 to 15 in 2018 and 27 in the Nov. 2025 elections, its best result yet. These successes have made it the largest single party in the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework.
The Khazali-Sadr dynamic has now entered the government. In August, political sources told Baghdad-based +964 Media that Sadr had objected to Laith Al-Khazali's candidacy for the deputy premiership, suggesting that his competence was untested "at this stage." Following the apparent end to US objections two months later, Laith eventually took the post all the same.
A reward for disarmament
Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq's first attempt to join the Iraqi cabinet appears to have run into opposition from the Trump administration. Days before the federal parliament was set to vote to confirm ministers in May, a senior US State Department official stated that American support for the new Iraqi government would start when Baghdad expels "terrorist militias from any state institution."
When most of Zaidi's cabinet was confirmed, the Sadiqoon bloc did not get its anticipated quota of ministries. Rather than being filled by other parties, the positions were left vacant.
Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq’s declaration of a break with the PMU in early June appears to have given power brokers in Baghdad something to sell in Washington. Victoria Taylor, director of the Atlantic Council's Iraq Initiative and a former senior US State Department official overseeing Iraq, told Amwaj.media that Iraqi officials and politicians "lobbied the United States heavily" to accept Laith Al-Khazali as deputy prime minister. Their case, she said, was "that there had to be some sort of recognition for [Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq's] steps toward disarmament."
Zaidi reportedly made that case to US Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq Thomas Barrack, arguing that factions giving up their arms must be rewarded to draw others after them. American acquiescence reportedly came during Zaidi's visit to Washington in September, in return for pledges to press ahead with the disarmament of ‘resistance factions’ and guarantees that such actors will not attack US interests.
Mamouri sees the reported nod to Khazali from the Trump administration as "the culmination of a longer process rather than a sudden change between May and October," but cautioned that it "does not establish that there was a specific bargain." Lahib Higel, deputy program director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, sees more action behind the scenes, telling Amwaj.media that "months of indirect negotiations between the US and Sadiqoon through Iraqi intermediaries bore fruit for Qais Al-Khazali." Against this backdrop, political insiders indicated that beyond Zaidi, Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan played a key role in helping broker the arrangement, reflecting the rising role of the top judge.
What Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq has actually surrendered under a quid pro quo remains unclear. Taylor noted that observers have suggested that the group "has hedged by holding onto some of [its] weaponry." In August, an anonymous security source told Iraqi media that the weapons handed over from two of Khazali’s three PMU brigades included fewer than ten drones, all without munitions, and no missiles. Higel called the weapons inventory in Baghdad’s possession "far from complete."
The government committee overseeing the handover of weapons has a benchmark for missiles, specified at a range of at least 300 km (186.4 miles). Per the latest inventory in late October, no such projectile had been collected, although Zaidi’s disarmament deadline is June 30, 2027.
Tolerated, not engaged
Whether any arrangement with Washington exists or not, Iraq now has a deputy prime minister who is a terrorist under American law.
In early 2020, following the American assassination of Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and PMU deputy chief Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis in Baghdad, the US State Department listed both of the Khazali brothers as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists.” In addition, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq was blacklisted as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.” As part of its pressure campaign against Iran and its regional alliance network, Washington as recently as May 2026 accused Laith of being involved in illicit oil smuggling.
"The US legal prohibitions on providing material support to a terrorist entity will remain a limiting factor in cooperation," Taylor explained. Treasury Department guidance holds that sanctioning an official does not block the body he serves, but bars US persons from dealing with him. That status could complicate the role Laith says he will play as deputy prime minister. He has presented the position as a job focused on providing services, listing housing projects and a ring road for Baghdad as part of his portfolio, areas where American firms and international aid programs are likely to be involved.
"While the United States has accepted Khazali as deputy PM as long as he remains sanctioned, the US government will not be able to work with him just as it could not work with the Ministry of Higher Education in the previous government," Taylor said. When the Sadiqoon bloc held the higher education ministry under former prime minister Muhammad Shia' Al-Sudani (2022-26), two sources told Axios in Nov. 2022 that Washington had decided not to work with the minister, Naim Al-Aboudi.
As of writing, no meeting between the Iraqi deputy premier and a US official has been reported.
The Sharaa template
Iraqi commentators have pointed to the US shift towards Syria as proof that American red lines can move. On Oct. 18, one Iraqi outlet described what it saw as Shiite armed factions' effective advance into Zaidi's government as a "Sharaa scenario."
"There are important differences, however," Taylor cautioned. "Sharaa was already in charge of Syria and there were no other clear alternative leaders. Sharaa also benefited from the strong support from Turkiye and Saudi Arabia." In contrast, Iran has historically been Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq's main patron, and the group has no regional backer aligned with Washington. Above all, the new Sunni-dominated administration in Damascus immediately cut ties with Tehran—a key US objective.
Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq has made no such break with the Islamic Republic, and its record against US forces runs deep. Back in 2007, American military officials said Qais Al-Khazali had authorized a raid in Karbala in which five US soldiers were killed, a role he described in a May 2025 interview as an “honorable” mission.