Reframing drone defense
: Korea must adapt to a paradigm shift in warfare amid rising drone threats
A weapon's price says little about the cost of stopping it. A drone costing a fraction of the cost of an interceptor can force its target to spend millions in reply. From Ukraine to the Middle East, that imbalance has made interception economics a central military concern.
South Korea offers little strategic depth, with critical infrastructure packed into a small territory within reach of a heavily armed neighbor.
It is against this strategic backdrop that the Defense Drone Agency was launched on Monday. The new body replaces the Drone Operations Command, which was dissolved amid controversy over its alleged role in the martial law declaration of Dec. 3, 2024.
Under the reorganization, each service will run its own drone operations; the new headquarters will oversee policy and support drone development and acquisition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will coordinate operations.
The services need direct command of the drones they deploy. Yet the force still needs common doctrine and central coordination. The headquarters has about 100 personnel, down from 280, but mid- and senior-ranking specialists now make up 50 percent, up from 17 percent.
A larger expert corps cannot guarantee sufficient authority over the services or smooth coordination among the Joint Chiefs and civilian procurement officials.
Pyongyang is building its own arsenal. A recent exhibition displayed more than 30 uncrewed aircraft, including attack drones and a large stealth-shaped aircraft. Kim Jong-un has called drone superiority indispensable and ordered faster development.
North Korea has publicized simulated exploding-drone strikes on mock South Korean guard posts and US tank targets. Its troops' experience in Russia's war against Ukraine, alongside closer military ties with Moscow, may sharpen tactics and support mass production. Drone strikes combined with heavy artillery would complicate detection and interception.
South Korea's recent trials expose the gap between procurement plans and usable weapons. In August, two domestically developed exploding drones fell into the sea seconds after launch from the 14,000-ton ROKS Marado, preventing a planned strike against a moving sea target. At a September ministry event, six of 17 demonstrations ran into trouble.
Seoul plans to acquire more than 20,000 low-cost combat drones and advance K-LUCAS, its long-range exploding-drone program. Despite its success in arms exports, the country has yet to export military drones, a sign that its own systems have yet to prove themselves in the field. Can domestic manufacturers deliver reliable systems in sufficient quantities?
That requires a faster path from commercial innovation to procurement. A US-style certification system could let the services buy vetted commercial drones without procurement delays. Domestic batteries and motors would reduce reliance on Chinese components.
Speed cannot excuse cursory testing. A drone delivered on schedule but unable to stay airborne is a failed purchase.
Even a successful interception can leave the defender worse off if it takes a multimillion-dollar missile to destroy a cheap drone. Jamming has limited value against autonomous aircraft able to navigate without communications or satellite signals.
Lasers offer repeated low-cost shots, but they are still limited by weather and the need to hold a beam on each target. At an Oct. 1 ceremony, the Cheongwang Block-I laser downed two of four drones after wind damaged optical-fiber equipment. Microwave weapons could disable several drones at once, but domestic systems remain under development.
No weapon can address every drone threat. South Korea needs layered defenses pairing jamming and interceptor drones with lasers and other energy weapons, supported by shared targeting information and realistic joint training.
The Defense Drone Agency's performance should be measured by how quickly it turns battlefield needs into dependable equipment and coherent doctrine. In a contest where cheap attacks can force costly responses, defenders must find a way to change the economics of interception.
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