In brief: European security expert Sven Biscop warns that Europe lacks the political command structure needed to fight Russia without US support. In a new Egmont Institute policy brief, he proposes a joint European “War Council” to coordinate military strategy, economic mobilization and crisis responses, warning that fragmented decision-making could lead to disaster in a direct confrontation with Moscow.

As Trump Embraces Putin, Expert Urges Europe to Prepare for War Without US

Europe must prepare to fight Russia without the US and establish a joint political and military “War Council” to coordinate its response, according to a new security analysis.

The warning comes as US President Donald Trump publicly embraced Russian President Vladimir Putin as a “friend” during their Nov. 19 summit in China, renewing questions about Washington’s relationship with Moscow and Europe’s ability to rely on American leadership in a security crisis.

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In a November policy brief titled The War Council, Sven Biscop, research director at Belgium’s Egmont Institute and professor at Ghent University, argues that Europe’s greatest weakness is not its military or economic strength but its inability to make rapid, unified decisions during wartime.

He warns that Putin could exploit those divisions, potentially miscalculating that European governments would fail to respond effectively to an attack on NATO or EU territory.

Biscop’s assessment raises a fundamental question for European governments: If the US increasingly treats Russia as a diplomatic partner while European countries regard Moscow as their principal security threat, can Europe still assume Washington would respond to a Russian attack as it has in the past?

Biscop does not argue that the US has abandoned NATO. Rather, he insists that European governments must prepare for a situation in which American military participation is delayed or absent.

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His proposal goes beyond increasing defense spending or acquiring additional weapons. Europe, he argues, needs a political command structure capable of coordinating military operations, economic mobilization, diplomacy and the wider demands of war.

NATO without the US: Europe must prepare to fight alone

One of Biscop’s most consequential warnings concerns the possibility that the US could decline to participate in a conventional European war, at least initially.

He identifies two scenarios: an American president who disagrees with Europe’s assessment of a threat, or a Washington administration whose military resources are already committed to a conflict in Asia.

Under either scenario, European governments would have to determine their own military objectives, organize their defenses and coordinate their broader response without waiting for Washington.

The argument marks a significant departure from Europe’s traditional reliance on American leadership within NATO.

Biscop distinguishes between the alliance’s existing military plans and the political decisions required to sustain a major war. NATO may be prepared to repel an initial invasion, but European leaders would still need to decide how far operations should extend, what political objectives they should pursue and how to mobilize their economies.

He also raises the question of identifying reliable partners beyond NATO and the EU, determining which countries would remain neutral and deciding how to approach governments whose interests might diverge from Europe’s.

Those concerns have acquired renewed significance following Trump’s meetings with Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Shenzhen.

Trump described Putin as his “friend” during their meeting Thursday and later praised his personal relationship with the Russian leader.

His remarks do not establish that Washington would refuse to defend a NATO ally. They do, however, provide a political backdrop to Biscop’s central argument: European defense planning must account for decisions in Washington that may not align with European security assessments.

Biscop previously warned Kyiv Post of a historic US-Europe rupture

Biscop’s latest proposal builds on warnings he delivered in an earlier interview with Kyiv Post on March 28, when he argued that the Trump administration’s relationship with Europe represented a fundamental change in transatlantic politics.

He said Washington increasingly regarded Europe as a geopolitical competitor rather than an automatic partner and warned that Ukraine could suffer the most immediate consequences of that shift.

Biscop also argued that Trump’s willingness to negotiate with Putin without European participation risked producing agreements at Ukraine’s expense.

His assessment of the American president’s geopolitical orientation was particularly pointed:

“I think Trump is closer to Putin than to Europe,” Biscop told Kyiv Post.

He warned that European leaders were increasingly recognizing the need for an independent defense capability, even while maintaining NATO as their preferred security framework.

At the time, Biscop said Europe needed contingency plans for a conflict in which American forces would not fight alongside European troops.

His November paper goes further by examining what European governments would actually need to do to conduct such a war, particularly when existing institutions divide responsibility among NATO, the EU and national governments.

The emphasis has shifted from whether Europe possesses enough military capabilities to whether it has the political machinery to use them effectively.

Who runs the war? Europe risks confusion and disaster

Biscop identifies what he considers a dangerous institutional vacuum: Europe has no single political body capable of directing a major war against a comparable military power.

He points to the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an example of how complicated European decision-making has become.

Military assistance and strategic decisions are divided among the European Union, NATO, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which includes the United States, and the Coalition of the Willing, which operates without Washington.

Each structure has different participants, powers and procedures.

Although this system has enabled Western countries to sustain considerable assistance to Kyiv, Biscop argues that it would be far more difficult to manage if European states were directly engaged in a large-scale war.

Such a confrontation would require governments to make immediate decisions about military operations, the movement of troops and supplies, weapons production, financial stability and relations with other countries.

Biscop argues that NATO’s military command structure cannot substitute for unified political leadership, particularly when many economic and industrial responsibilities fall under EU or national authority.

He therefore proposes linking NATO’s Article 5 collective defense mechanism with the EU’s Article 42.7 mutual assistance provision, allowing both institutions to mobilize their respective powers.

His broader concern is that Moscow could misinterpret Europe’s fragmented political structures as evidence that its member states would be unable to respond together.

That perception, he argues, could weaken deterrence even if Europe’s combined military and economic resources were sufficient to confront Russia.

‘Would Europe Have Enough Time?’ Lessons from World War II

To illustrate the dangers of preparing for war too late, Biscop draws a historical comparison between Britain and France during World War II.

Britain, he writes, required approximately a year to develop the political and military decision-making machinery needed to direct its war effort effectively.

It benefited from the English Channel, which prevented German ground forces from advancing directly onto British territory and gave London time to organize.

France did not have that advantage. German forces overwhelmed the country in 1940, and the French government sought an armistice.

Biscop raises the possibility that modern European governments could face a similar problem if a conflict began before they had established effective mechanisms for collective leadership.

The comparison is particularly relevant to NATO’s eastern members, where geography could leave governments little time to resolve political disagreements or develop new command structures after an attack.

Biscop’s argument is not that Europe lacks the resources to defend itself. It is that those resources may prove insufficient if European leaders fail to organize the political systems needed to employ them.

His proposed War Council is intended to address precisely that problem before a crisis begins.

A European War Council: Britain, France, Germany and Poland at the table

Biscop proposes creating a small executive body bringing together the leaders of Britain, France, Germany and Poland, alongside the presidents of the European Council and European Commission and NATO’s secretary general.

Senior military officials would advise the council, while other European leaders and partners could participate when directly affected by a crisis.

Ukraine, Biscop argues, should be invited when decisions concern Russia’s war against it.

The council would operate across the EU and NATO, providing a forum for rapid political coordination without replacing the existing institutions responsible for formally approving decisions.

Biscop acknowledges that current EU and NATO treaties would not allow such a body to issue legally binding decisions independently.

Nevertheless, he argues that agreement among Europe’s principal political and military powers could establish a common position for the broader institutions to adopt.

Biscop proposes regular meetings and immediate consultations during major security crises to avoid delays caused by negotiations across multiple institutions.

The goal is to establish clear decision-making procedures before a war begins, rather than improvising them during a conflict.

Leipzig Airport attack exposes gaps in Europe’s response to Russia

Biscop also points to the attempted attack at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport as a warning about Europe’s response to Russian hybrid warfare.

On Aug. 4, an explosive-laden drone was discovered near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at the airport.

German authorities formally attributed the Sept. 1 attempted attack to Russia, raising concerns about Moscow’s sabotage operations against facilities linked to military assistance for Ukraine.

Biscop argues that the incident exposed Europe’s fragmented response to Russian threats, warning that NATO and the EU lack the coordination needed to act swiftly and collectively against attacks that fall short of conventional warfare.

Europe must rethink its assumptions about allies and adversaries

Biscop’s warnings take on additional significance following the Shenzhen summit, where Trump publicly embraced Putin while discussing prospects for ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.

On Friday, Trump again praised his relationship with the Kremlin leader, claiming their discussions had been productive and that Putin wanted a diplomatic settlement.

The president also declined to address Ukraine’s security guarantees in detail before an agreement was reached.

For European leaders, the contrast raises a difficult strategic question: How should they prepare for a war with Russia when their most powerful NATO ally maintains an increasingly cordial relationship with the Kremlin?

Biscop’s analysis does not suggest abandoning NATO or treating the United States as an adversary. His argument is that Europe can no longer assume American participation, guidance or shared threat assessments in every security crisis.

This would require European governments to reconsider not only their defense capabilities but also the reliability of their political partnerships and the institutions through which they make collective decisions.