The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are one of the two armed parties in the current war in Sudan. Despite their historic collaborations with multiple domestic and external actors, everyone is washing their hands of them. In this piece, I will try to make sense of the RSF and conclude by associating its institutionalisation with the convergence of goals between Sudan and the EU in the 2010s.
It depends on where you stand to identify the root causes of the formalisation and institutionalisation of the RSF. In 2003, when the war broke out in Darfur, Sudan’s western region, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) received a humiliating shock. The Sudanese government then mobilised Darfurians, who know the geography of the area and who were mobile enough to cope with the insurgents’ tactics. The rebel groups were mostly from non-Arab ancestries, while the bulk of the counterinsurgent militias were Darfurian Arabs including Mohammad Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemedti’ (the current leader of RSF) and others. The counterinsurgency campaign was successful militarily, but against the backdrop of this ‘‘succes’’ the campaign left damaging results. The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant, in March 2009, for Al-Basheer, then the president of Sudan, for war crimes and crimes against humanity during the counter insurgency. What is relevant here is the governmental admiration for this model received despite the associated ethical and reputational costs. The informal militias were deployed outside of Darfur and grew in size, and in 2013 they were given an official identity as the ‘RSF’ and attached to the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS).
The RSF was considered by many as a coup-proofing tool. Al-Basheer was an army officer and seized power through a military coup. As an insider, he knew what a strong army could do for a dictator’s throne. The NISS received better treatment than the army, elevating it to a rival status with the SAF, something that caused angst within SAF ranks. In November 2012, authorities foiled a coup that had the former chief of NISS, Salah Goush, as the putschist. Again, the playbook was revisited and this time the rising player was RSF. Hemedti would subsequently quip that ‘Sudan has no army but us.’
Making Sense of the RSF
The key decisions leading to the formulation of the RSF took place between 2013 and 2014 in Sudan and Europe. In Sudan, Al-Basheer’s regime was experiencing a difficult time. On the 27th of January 2014, Al-Basheer addressed the nation in what was known as the ‘National Leap Speech’. He considered four prerequisites for the country to leap forward: Peace, free and rule-abiding political community, lifting the Sudanese from poverty into prosperity, finally reviving the ‘Sudanese Identity’. In addressing poverty, Al-Basheer zeroed in on sanctions as a major hindrance in the alleviating poverty in Sudan.
To the north, Europe was facing what it described as a ‘Migration Crisis’. In November 2014, the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, known as the Khartoum Process, was established. It was meant to be a platform for political cooperation between Horn of Africa and Europe regarding migration routes. In November 2015, the Valletta Summit action plan was issued. This plan served as a marriage of convenience between the Sudanese government and the EU. The latter wanted to address migration, while the former was keen to achieve the leap goals through partnering with a global power like the EU.
The government started drafting and amending acts eagerly to prove itself as a reliable partner in the addressing migration. In January 2014, it issued the Asylum Regulating Act 2014, repealing The Regulation of Asylum Act 1974. The new act imposed more restrictions on the movement of refugees in Sudan. They were not allowed to move outside their registered residence without permission. The law vested authority in the Minister of Interior to establish, close or transfer any refugee camp.
18 months later, the Sudan’s Passports and Immigration Act 2015 was passed. Harbouring aliens who are not eligible to reside in Sudan was now considered a crime. Those found guilty were subject to two years imprisonment and a fine. The same act considered involvement in human trafficking an offense resulting in imprisonment for between five to ten years, and the court had the right to confiscate any property used in trafficking. None of these provisions were outlined in the repealed 1994 act.
The newly adopted act was in tandem with another one passed in March 2014, the Combating of Human Trafficking Act 2014, Defining crimes such as human trafficking, transnational human trafficking, providing a coverup for criminals, exposing a victim/witness, using revenue of human trafficking activities, suborning perjury, providing locations for trafficking activities and cybercrimes.
In January 2017, the marriage of convenience between the EU and Sudanese government’s needs culminated with the passage of the Rapid Support Forces Act 2017. The Act included several articles that were linked to the previous legislations and amendments. Although, the act claimed that the RSF were part of the SAF, it had broader implications, especially when it came to defining adversaries. In the Sudanese Armed Forces Act 2007, the enemy was foreign designated adversaries, insurgents, and gangs ‘on alert’ that threaten the national security. RSF’s definition of enemy went beyond these categories to include anyone operating outside of the lawand all manner of criminal gangs.
The Valletta Plan provided for the formalisation and institutionalisation of such powers in a group like the RSF. The plan committed to ‘Establish or upgrade national and regional anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking legislation, policies and action plans in countries and regions of origin and transit of migration’ by the end of 2016. Interestingly, the plan’s vision for addressing the root causes of migration through a commitment ‘Launch projects to enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in regions of origin and transit of migrants in East, North and West Africa to enhance the professional skills and employability of young people ‘was the same theme for Al-Basheer in his previously mentioned speech.
Several reports were published as an alarm for the EU that funds dedicated for the Khartoum Process might fall in the hands of a genocidal militia. Border Control from Hell is one these reports. It outlined how EU funds, including Better Migration Management (BMM) projects, could be leaked to RSF especially assets that are labelled as dual use. Aiding Autocrats, a newly published book, provides a detailed account on how the EU funds were spent in Sudan, and the criticism regarding the possible support for RSFWhat is common among this report and book and other scholarly materials is the continuous denial from the EU about supporting RSF.
EU-Tainted Legislations
The EU was hearing what it wanted to hear while the Sudanese government secured its sought-after funds.
Hemedti did not refrain from blackmailing the EU whenever he had a mic in front of him. In a television programme, in October 2018, he asked Europeans for more money because he was fightings illegal migration on their behalf. Six months earlier, during a graduation ceremony, Hemedti asked the EU recognise his forces efforts to halt migration and combat human trafficking and threatened to act if these demands were not achieved. Despite the continuous denials by the EU and the relentless blackmailing by Hemedti, he was the first official to meet European ambassadors after the fall of Al-Basheer’s regime, under his then-new role: deputy head of the transitional military council.
The EU stopped borders control projects in Sudan a few months after the demise of Al-Basheer, but the legislations, institutions, actors, and impacts of that cooperation are far from gone.
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