The story: As millions of Muslims descend on the holy city of Karbala for the annual Arbaeen pilgrimage, Iraq’s supreme Shiite religious authority has rejected the use of his image in public spaces. The rare intervention comes amid rumours that Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is engaged in the tense debate over the future of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU).

The coverage: An Aug. 3 statement issued by Sistani’s office called out the use by “some political and service entities” of the top cleric’s likeness on “banners and posters.”

  • While the statement highlights the use of Sistani’s image on Arbaeen pilgrimage routes, the broader condemnation of the practice is suggestive of a more wide-ranging prohibition.

  • A report by the Iraq-based +964 Media suggested that the announcement was in line with the senior clergyman’s “consistent stance on non-involvement in electoral politics,” while acknowledging concerns about the politicization of his image ahead of polls.

Reactions on social media have laid bare the varied perspectives on Sistani’s influence, with users clashing over claims of his non-interference in formal politics.

  • In a controversial and widely-read Aug. 4 post on Twitter/X, one detractor based in the Gulf lambasted the 93-year-old cleric, who was born in Iran, saying that he “has no connection to Iraq except that he lives off the wealth of that country, yet he controls its fate.”

  • The Aug. 4 X post further claimed that “the state operates according to [Sistani’s] recommendations,” drawing significant anger from some. One user angrily responded that “whoever tells you that Sistani interferes in politics is a liar.”

Augmenting the debate, an Aug. 6 report by Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat, citing “prominent Iraqi figures,” claimed that Sistani has recently been “moving to fill an Iranian vacuum in Baghdad” amid a heating up of the debate over the future status of the PMU.

The context/analysis: Sistani’s relationship with the PMU—a vast umbrella organization that brings together scores of factions with differing allegiances—is complex.

  • When the Islamic State group (IS) seized much of northern Iraq in a 2014 blitz, the supreme Shiite religious authority issued an edict, known as a fatwa, that urged all able-bodied men to fight back. The call for action led tens of thousands of volunteers to sign up, and was the catalyst for the formation of the PMU.

  • In 2016, the Iraqi government formalized the PMU as a component of Iraq’s armed forces. At the time, top allies of Iran, such as former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki (2006-14), controversially justified the move by claiming Sistani’s support.

Since then, the PMU’s Iran-backed factions—arguably the most powerful—have remained, according to critics, largely independent of Baghdad’s central authority. 

  • According to experts, Sistani has rebuffed subsequent calls for him to issue a new edict that would dissolve the PMU.

  • Reports suggest that since the top cleric’s original edict solely called for “volunteers” to defend the country, he has claimed no authority to counter or reverse the PMU’s legal status, which has been approved by the Iraqi state.

The current status of the PMU is contentious. “Shrine units” are loyal to Sistani and maintain a largely apolitical stance, while reportedly operating outside the umbrella force’s chain of command.

  • In parallel, fighters answering to Shiite cleric and politician Muqtada Al-Sadr, a rival of Iran-allied forces, operate as Saraya Al-Salam, which was in March this year ordered by Sadr not to carry or display arms.

  • At present, the core factions which made up the PMU from its inception in 2014 remain essentially the same. The leaders of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, the Badr Organization and Kata’ib Hezbollah are also dominant members of the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework.


Given these complex politics, Sistani's directive over the use of his image could signal multiple considerations.

  • First and foremost, the top cleric has long sought to avoid involvement in politics, and that remains a priority in an election year. Moreover, as there is sharp controversy over the future of the PMU, Sistani can be expected to carefully maneuver to stay above the fray.

  • In addition, there may be deeper machinations to distinguish the “shrine units” that fought IS from the Iran-allied factions that are now under intense scrutiny in Iraq and abroad.

Meanwhile, apparent moves to reign in some of the PMU’s more autonomous factions seem to be gaining pace.

  • Clashes in Baghdad on July 27 between Iraqi security forces and Kata’ib Hezbollah—known as the PMU’s 45th and 46th Brigades—have reportedly led to the announcement of major disciplinary and legal measures.

  • According to an Aug. 8 statement by Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani’s representative, the premier—acting as commander-in-chief—moved to dismiss the commanders of the PMU’s 45th and 46th Brigades, prosecute those found responsible and initiate a review of leadership and control procedures within the PMU as a whole.

The future: Sistani's image prohibition signals his continued aversion to direct involvement in politics ahead of November's elections, suggesting that he will maintain his traditional position of encouraging participation while avoiding candidate or party endorsements.

  • This approach may frustrate various Shiite political and military factions seeking legitimization through Sistani’s effective endorsement, particularly as the Coordination Framework faces profound internal fractures.

  • Regardless of whether rumors over Sistani’s increased engagement with the PMU disarmament debate are true, any such moves and discussions will likely remain behind the scenes.

However, without Sistani's active political guidance, the political space may be filled by polarizing figures—or increased Iranian influence through its network of political and bureaucratic allies.

  • Sistani’s distance from direct political involvement raises questions about whether religious authority can effectively counter Iraq's democratic deficits without more active intervention, particularly if the conflict over the PMU’s future heats up.