Iran appears set to firmly keep its relations with Iraq in the hands of its security establishment. Reports that Tehran has nominated Abdolreza Masgarian, a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, as its next ambassador to Baghdad have yet to be officially confirmed.
If the nomination goes ahead, the choice would come as no surprise as Iran faces the prospect of a third war with Israel and the United States in little over a year. In many ways, it would extend Iran’s longstanding practice of placing figures with security backgrounds at the center of its ties with Iraq, and suggest continuity in Tehran’s strategic objectives even as its tactics evolve.
At the same time, US pressure on the Iraqi government could cause procedural issues whereby, if Masgarian is officially nominated, the conditions of his presence in Baghdad may not be clear cut. In this respect, Iran’s recent experiences in Lebanon offer a poignant precedent for a possible “gray” diplomatic presence in Iraq.
Why might Tehran choose Masgarian?
Masgarian’s public profile is rooted in Iran’s security establishment and its long involvement in Iraq. Among other senior military positions, he has served as commander of the Quds Force’s Ramadan Headquarters, working closely with the slain former head of the elite unit, Qasem Soleimani.
This author personally encountered Masgarian in official meetings with former Iraqi prime minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi (2020–22). There, Masgarian appeared alongside Quds Force commander Esmail Qa’ani, former ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaeifar and other senior Quds Force commanders. His presence and role in those discussions clearly indicated that he held a significant position on the Iraq dossier in Tehran. It also suggested that he was being positioned for a possible future ambassadorship in Baghdad.
What stood out in those sessions was Masgarian’s comprehensive grasp of Iraqi politics. Reportedly hailing from Iran’s Kurdish-majority west and fluent in Arabic, his knowledge extended beyond the Shiite parties most commonly associated with Tehran’s influence to the Kurdish and Sunni figures whose decisions matter just as much to governing Iraq. He appeared to understand the relationships, competing interests and sensitivities that shape their dealings with one another. The impression was of a figure who treats Iraq as a complex political arena demanding detailed knowledge and a wide network of contacts, and who can work beyond Iran’s established allies with politicians who hold different priorities and views of Tehran.
Masgarian’s presence in Iraq has recently grown more visible. He has headed Iranian delegations discussing implementation of the 2023 Iran–Iraq security agreement with Baghdad as well as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Those contacts help explain why Tehran might consider him as diplomatic envoy. He would bring established relationships and experience of the overlapping political and security questions that shape Iran’s engagement with Iraq. His reported nomination would be a plausible progression from an established role, particularly in conditions where the security dimension to the bilateral relationship is growing more prominent.
Continuity in strategy, change in tactics?
Masgarian’s reported selection is best understood against Tehran’s enduring objectives in Iraq. These are to maintain a friendly government in Baghdad, protect security and economic interests, preserve relationships across the political establishment and prevent Iraq from becoming a platform for threats against Iran. Most importantly, Tehran seeks to preserve the position of allied ‘resistance’ factions in Iraq in the face of US pressure to weaken them.
Such objectives leave room for changes in personnel, political relationships and negotiating methods without a change in strategy. The question is therefore whether Masgarian’s appointment would serve a different policy or bring an experienced figure into the diplomatic management of an existing one.
One Iranian source with close knowledge of the Islamic Republic’s policy toward Iraq told Amwaj.media that Iranian decision makers recognize how regional dynamics have shifted since Oct. 2023, but do not see those changes as grounds for a strategic reversal—especially in Iraq. According to the source, Tehran remains confident that its influence there is substantial and that Baghdad will not turn decisively toward Washington, despite tactical adjustments in Iraqi policy.
That helps explain why Iran would keep drawing its ambassadors to Baghdad from the same security establishment. From the Iranian perspective, changing circumstances call for adaptation within an established approach. Seen in this light, Masgarian’s military background and his experience with Iraqi political actors and Kurdish officials could make him useful in preserving Iranian influence under more difficult conditions.
Will Baghdad accept Masgarian?
Tehran’s reported choice does not settle whether Baghdad will accept him. Under diplomatic rules, Iraq can withhold consent to a proposed ambassador without explaining its reasons. No decision approving or rejecting Masgarian has been made public.
There are nevertheless signs of hesitation within the Iraqi government. One source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office told Amwaj.media that Ali Al-Zaidi is studying the possibility of rejecting the nomination. According to the source, Washington is pressing Iraq’s premier to refuse any Iranian ambassador with an IRGC background.
Notably, the Islamic Republic’s envoys to sensitive posts such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria are customarily either card-carrying Quds Force officers, or enjoy close working relationships with the expeditionary unit. Amid the current intense US pressure on Iran, this dynamic is turning out to be problematic.
Named as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut earlier this year, Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani reportedly never got a chance to present his credentials. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in early March asked authorities to identify IRGC officers in the country and "take firm and immediate action to prevent any security or military activity or operation they may carry out from Lebanese territory, regardless of their status or the cover under which they operate, and to arrest them under the supervision of the competent judiciary in preparation for their deportation."
A few weeks later, on Mar. 24, the Lebanese government withdrew Sheibani’s accreditation and declared him persona non grata. The diplomat, who served as ambassador to Syria between 2011 and 2016—at the height of the Iranian military intervention in support of the Syrian government—was given five days to leave over "Tehran's violation of the established norms and rules governing diplomatic relations between the two countries." However, with the support of Hezbollah, Sheibani remained in Lebanon. Five months later, as an apparent compromise, the authorities there issued him a six-month residency permit as a “former diplomat,”letting him remain in Beirut without diplomatic status or immunity.
In this context, the Iraqi government’s rejection of Masgaran as ambassador would likely face strong opposition from a majority of the members of the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, many of whom have longstanding relationships with the Iranian commander. According to the source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office, the nomination has become a point of contention between external pressure and the political relationships underpinning the Baghdad government, rather than a routine diplomatic decision.
Indeed, the comparison with Lebanon illustrates one possible response. But Iraq’s political circumstances differ substantially. In Baghdad, the opposition described by the Iraqi source would make outright rejection politically costly. Masgarian’s established connections within the Coordination Framework give influential Iraqi actors their own reasons to support his appointment.
On that reading, stalling appears more likely than rejection. In other words, Prime Minister Zaidi could leave the approval process unresolved while managing US pressure and negotiating with his political partners.
The meaning for Iraq and the region
If officially confirmed, Masgarian’s appointment would place an experienced security interlocutor at the center of Iran’s formal relationship with Iraq. His familiarity with Baghdad and Erbil’s political establishments could give him access and influence from the outset. For Iraqi officials, that could make him a useful channel to the institutions that shape Tehran’s decisions on Iraq. This matters especially amid the ongoing dispute between the Iraqi federal government and some elements of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) that refuse to integrate fully with the state and hand over all their military capabilities.
But access cuts both ways. The same relationships that could help resolve disagreements would also give Iran an experienced advocate for its interests when they conflict with Baghdad’s priorities.
Relations with Erbil would be another important task. Masgarian’s experience with Kurdish officials and the Iran-Iraq bilateral security agreement could help sustain negotiations over border security and the exiled Iranian Kurdish opposition groups that have come under repeated IRGC bombardment since the Israeli-US war on Iran began in February. His contacts may ease communication, but they would not remove the underlying differences over what Tehran demands and what Iraqi Kurdish authorities are willing or able to deliver. The measure of his effectiveness would be whether those relationships produce workable compromises or become channels for additional pressure.
Masgarian’s dealings with armed factions would carry greater consequences for Iraqi sovereignty. A diplomat familiar with these networks might help convey Iranian preferences or mediate disputes. The consequential question is whether Tehran would use his relationships to support restraint and accommodation with the Iraqi government, or to preserve Shiite armed factions’ ability to operate beyond its authority.
For Baghdad’s relationship with Washington, a dispute over Masgarian’s nomination may prove revealing before the Iranian official even arrives in the Iraqi capital. If the US pressure described by the source in the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office continues, accepting Masgarian could become a test of how far Zaidi is prepared to accommodate the Donald Trump administration’s demands.