The story: Israel’s killing of former supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the appointment of his son Mojtaba as his successor have opened a period of uncertainty over the future direction of Iran. Developments in recent weeks related to the country’s missile and nuclear programs as well as intelligence ministry suggest the transition is also prompting a rethink of some of the political and ideological constraints that shaped the Islamic Republic under the late supreme leader.

The coverage: In the aftermath of Ali Khamenei’s death on Feb. 28 this year, several longstanding features of the Iranian state are being reconsidered: from a self-imposed limit on the range of its missiles to its opposition to nuclear weapons and the rule that the intelligence minister be qualified in Islamic jurisprudence.

The clearest sign of the shift came on Nov. 7, when Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesman Hossein Mohebbi announced that restrictions on the range of Iran's ballistic missiles had been lifted.

  • On Oct. 31, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei instructed senior armed forces commanders that “every level and type of threat” must be met with an “immediate and effective” response “without geographic limitation.”

  • Asked by reporters whether that meant Iran was no longer limiting the range of its missiles, Mohebbi said, “This restriction has been lifted for us, but we must reveal these capabilities in practice rather than merely issuing slogans beforehand.”

A more consequential shift may be under way in the debate over Iran's nuclear program. Since the war with Israel in June 2025 and the current war with Israel and the US, calls to abandon the country's longstanding opposition to nuclear weapons have grown louder among politicians, clerics and state-affiliated media.

  • The late former supreme leader had issued a religious edict—or fatwa—prohibiting the production and use of weapons of mass destruction, which Tehran repeatedly cited as proof that its nuclear program was peaceful.

  • Ali Khamenei's killing removed the figure most closely associated with that ban.

Some hardliners have for months been urging the new supreme leader to overturn his father's fatwa and authorize the development of a nuclear deterrent. In the face of a potential renewed war, those sentiments are now spreading across the political spectrum.

  • Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), acknowledged on Oct. 31 that a debate was underway over whether Iran should keep its nuclear doctrine if war resumed. He stressed, however, that no official decision had been made to change it.

  • Prominent conservative commentator Foad Izadi pushed for a nuclear deterrent in remarks published on Nov. 8. “I am not aware of a country that possesses nuclear weapons and has had its leader killed or martyred,” he said.

Meanwhile, debate continues over whether to drop the requirement that the intelligence minister be qualified in Islamic jurisprudence, with contradictory signals coming from the parliament's national security and foreign policy commission.

  • Amir Hayat-Moqaddam, deputy chairman of the commission, claimed on Nov. 7 that the commission had “reviewed” and “approved” a proposal to drop the requirement.

  • The following day, commission spokesman Hassan Qashqavi explained that Hayat-Moqaddam had meant the topic was discussed in the commission “and members expressed their views.” Qashqavi insisted that no bill had been submitted to the commission.

Iran has had no permanent intelligence minister since Esmail Khatib was killed on Mar. 17 during the war with Israel and the United States. The delay in naming a successor has angered hardline lawmakers in particular.

  • MP Amir Hossein Sabeti, a vocal critic of Reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian's administration, alleged on Nov. 4 that the delay was due to the president “insisting on a particular person” becoming the next minister. Sabeti added that the supreme leader had called the candidate “no good,” though he provided no evidence for the claim.

  • On Nov. 6, MP Morteza Mahmoudi accused the president of putting the country's security at risk, warning that it “must not be sacrificed” to his “insistence on introducing a specific person.”

  • Neither Mahmoud nor Sabeti named the president's alleged pick. But the moderate news site Fararu, citing two unnamed sources, claimed on Nov. 7 that Pezeshkian's choice is Mostafa Pourmohammadi, who served as justice minister (2013-17) under moderate former president Hassan Rouhani. Notably, Pourmohammadi is a cleric.

The context/analysis: The increasingly open debate about nuclear weapons, talk of abandoning Ali Khamenei’s missile range restrictions and installation of non-clerics as intelligence ministers come as Iran’s new leadership confronts the consequences of a war that exposed deep vulnerabilities in the military and security apparatus.

  • The killing of senior military commanders, nuclear scientists and intelligence officials has intensified questions about the effectiveness of the country's deterrence strategy and institutional arrangements.

For the past decade, Iran has maintained a self-imposed range limit of 2,000 km (1,240 miles) for its missiles: enough to reach Israel and US bases in much of West Asia, but not more distant targets.

  • The limit initially surfaced in connection with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), when Europe and the US wanted to address the Iranian ballistic missile program as part of nuclear negotiations. Iran flatly refused to discuss its defense capabilities. Tehran’s subsequent unilateral announcement of a range limit has been widely understood as an unwritten compromise on the matter.

  • The apparent removal of the restriction on the reach of Iran’s missiles signals a willingness to drop a restraint that helped reassure European countries about the Islamic Republic’s ballistic missile program.

  • The announcement does not, however, show that Iran already has operational missiles that can fly farther.

In mid-August, a spokesman for the parliament's presiding board said the government had been given until early October to nominate candidates for the intelligence ministry.

  • MP Abbas Goudarzi said an idea had been raised to remove the requirement for the intelligence minister to be a mujtahid who is able to engage in ijtihad—the capability to deduce new rules from existing laws.

  • Goudarzi said such a proposal would require an amendment to existing legislation and that the government was expected to submit a bill to the parliament.

  • Raising eyebrows, a conservative former chief of the state broadcaster publicly welcomed the prospect of removing the requirement. Ezzatollah Zarqami wrote on Twitter/X, "I hope the requirement of ijtihad for this post is removed soon so that we do not suffer from a shortage of capable people."

Dropping the requirement that the intelligence minister must be an Islamic jurist would open the ministry’s leadership to security professionals without clerical credentials, although the change would still need the approval of the parliament and the Guardian Council.

  • The requirement, set by legislation in 1983, has meant that every permanent intelligence minister since the ministry was established that year has been a cleric.

  • The long formal vacancy at the top of the ministry has also exposed tensions within the political establishment.

  • The dispute raises questions about the future role of the clergy in the security institutions, and about the balance of authority between the elected government and the supreme leader.

The future: It is too early to read the missile, nuclear and security developments as hard evidence of a fundamental transformation of the Islamic Republic.

  • Still, they offer an early glimpse of a system that may be moving away from some of its established conventions toward a more professionalized, security-driven model of governance.

  • The emerging changes could reflect an effort to put military effectiveness and security expertise first while preserving the system's centralized political structure.

  • Under the late Ali Khamenei, the Islamic Republic combined ideological constraints, strategic ambiguity and carefully calibrated military policies. His successor now faces pressure to reconsider whether that mix can keep the country secure after a war seen as greatly caused by a failure of deterrence.