Walk into one of Ghana’s growing China Malls and the economic reality confronting the country becomes difficult to ignore. The shelves are full. The prices are attractive. Consumers have access to household items, electronics, furniture, clothing, tools and countless other products at prices many local retailers struggle to match.
From the perspective of the ghanaian consumer, this is good news. But from the perspective of an economy trying to industrialise, there is a much bigger question:
What happens to a country when it becomes exceptionally good at consuming what other countries are exceptionally good at producing?
This is the question Ghana must confront. China Malls are not necessarily the cause of Ghana’s industrial weakness. They are, rather, a visible symptom of a deeper structural problem: Ghana has liberalised consumption faster than it has built productive capacity.
China’s position in Ghana’s import economy illustrates the scale of the challenge. Ghana Statistical Service data show that China remained Ghana’s largest import partner in 2024, with imports from China rising from GHS 33.9 billion in 2023 to GHS 56.8 billion in 2024.¹ WTO data similarly place China among the largest single sources of Ghana’s merchandise imports.²
So the question should not simply be whether Ghanaians should patronise China Mall. The deeper question is: Why are we importing so much of what we could eventually produce ourselves?
The China Mall Is Not the Enemy
We must be careful here. China has become extraordinarily competitive because it built an industrial ecosystem capable of producing at scale, cheaply and increasingly technologically. Chinese firms have factories, logistics networks, financing mechanisms, supply chains and access to enormous domestic and international markets.
That is precisely the lesson Ghana should be learning. Recent research on Chinese private capital in Ghana shows that the Chinese commercial presence is evolving beyond simply importing finished products. Some Chinese businesses are increasingly assembling and manufacturing in Ghana, while Chinese-linked manufacturing operations have begun supplying products to local markets and, in some cases, the wider African market.
That is potentially positive. If a Chinese company establishes a factory in Ghana, employs Ghanaians, transfers technology, sources inputs locally, develops Ghanaian suppliers and exports through AfCFTA, then Ghana is not simply importing China. Ghana is capturing part of China’s productive capacity.
That is the model we should pursue. The problem arises when our economic relationship with the rest of the world is overwhelmingly organised around importing finished goods and exporting raw materials. That is not strategic autonomy. It is commercial dependency.
The Problem With Liberalising Before Industrialising
For decades, developing countries have often been told that free trade will produce efficiency. There is truth in that argument. Competition can force companies to become more productive. Imports can give consumers cheaper goods. Foreign investment can bring technology and capital. Access to international markets can create opportunities for exporters.
But there is an important question that conventional free-trade arguments sometimes overlook: competition between whom?
A Ghanaian manufacturer with expensive electricity, expensive credit, limited access to technology, high logistics costs, and a relatively small domestic market is not necessarily competing on equal terms with a Chinese manufacturer operating inside one of the world’s largest industrial ecosystems. Opening the market does not magically create equality between the two. It can instead eliminate the Ghanaian producer before that producer has had the opportunity to become competitive.
This is the fundamental logic behind the infant-industry argument. An infant industry cannot necessarily compete with an established foreign industry on day one. It needs time, capital, technology, infrastructure, skilled workers, and access to markets — and, sometimes, temporary protection.
The argument is not that Ghanaian companies should be protected forever. It is that you cannot expect a seedling to compete with a fully grown tree simply because both have been placed in the same forest.
Britain Did Not Become Powerful by Preaching Free Trade From the Beginning
There is an uncomfortable historical reality about the contemporary free-trade debate: some of the countries that eventually became the strongest advocates of open markets did not industrialize under completely open markets.
Britain is perhaps the most important example. For centuries, British commercial policy contained strong protectionist and mercantilist elements. The Navigation Acts, beginning in the seventeenth century, sought to control shipping and commercial flows in favour of English interests. The Corn Laws later protected British agriculture through restrictions and tariffs on imported grain.⁴
Britain eventually became a powerful advocate of free trade, particularly after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and the Navigation Acts in 1849. The lesson is not that protectionism automatically creates prosperity. It is that trade policy has historically been connected to the stage of economic development and national strategy.
Britain liberalised from a position of considerable industrial strength. That distinction matters for Ghana. We should not confuse the economic policy appropriate for an industrial power with the policy appropriate for a country still trying to build an industrial base.
America Understood the Infant-Industry Argument
The United States provides another important case. Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures, submitted to Congress in 1791, argued for the deliberate development of American manufacturing and included protective tariffs as part of that strategy.⁵ The early American industrial-policy framework explicitly recognised tariffs as a means of nurturing infant industries, and the United States subsequently developed a long tradition of tariff protection, particularly through the nineteenth century.
This history should not be romanticised. Protectionism has also produced failures: the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1930 became associated with a destructive period of trade retaliation and contributed to the deterioration of international trade during the Great Depression.⁶
That is precisely why Ghana should not pursue blind protectionism. The lesson is not “tariffs are always good.” The lesson is that trade policy must serve industrial strategy.
South Korea Provides Perhaps the More Relevant Lesson
For Ghana, South Korea may be an even more useful comparison. South Korea emerged from war with very limited industrial capacity. Yet it did not simply wait for the market to determine what the country should produce. The Korean state actively directed credit, protected selected industries, promoted exports and supported strategic sectors.
During the 1970s, South Korea aggressively pursued heavy and chemical industrialisation. Research on the country’s Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive finds that these policies expanded targeted industries and generated benefits that persisted even after the policies themselves ended.⁷ South Korea subsequently became more open as its industrial capacity strengthened.
Ghana’s Problem Is Not Simply Imports. It Is the Structure of Our Economy.
Ghana cannot realistically produce everything. Nor should it. No serious economic strategy would require Ghana to manufacture every smartphone, aircraft, computer chip, or medical machine consumed domestically. Strategic autonomy does not mean autarky — it means having enough domestic productive capacity that the country is not structurally vulnerable.
The objective should therefore be selective. Ghana should identify strategic sectors where domestic production is economically and technologically feasible, and where excessive import dependence creates economic vulnerability. These could include:
- Agro-processing
- Pharmaceuticals
- Textiles and garments
- Furniture
- Building materials
- Basic chemicals
- Machinery and agricultural equipment
- Packaging
- Food processing
- Selected electronics assembly
- Renewable-energy components
- Defence and security-related production
- Digital and technology services
The objective should be value addition. Why should Ghana export cocoa and import chocolate? Why should we export minerals and import finished products containing those minerals? Why should we produce cotton and agricultural raw materials but import the finished consumer goods that could instead create manufacturing jobs here? Why should the Ghanaian market become the final destination for other people’s industrial production?
The China Model Itself Offers Ghana an Important Lesson
Ironically, perhaps the greatest lesson China offers Ghana is not to import Chinese goods. It is how China built the capacity to produce them.
China’s economic rise was built around manufacturing, infrastructure, industrial clusters, export capacity, technological learning and massive investment in productive capabilities. Today, China continues to prioritise advanced manufacturing as a central pillar of its economic strategy — and Western governments increasingly complain about Chinese industrial overcapacity precisely because China’s producer-oriented economic model keeps generating enormous manufacturing capacity and export competitiveness.
Ghana should therefore look at the China Mall and ask a different question. Not “how do we stop Chinese products?” but “how do we develop Ghanaian firms capable of competing with them?” That is a far more strategic question.
Protectionism Must Come With Discipline
There is a major danger here. If Ghana protects domestic businesses without demanding performance, protectionism will simply create comfortable monopolies. That would be disastrous.
A Ghanaian company should not receive protection merely because it is Ghanaian. Protection should be conditional: if government gives a company tariff protection, that company should carry measurable obligations in return. For example:
Years 1–3: increase domestic production and employment.
Years 3–5: increase local sourcing and technological capability.
Years 5–7: meet specified productivity and quality standards.
Years 7–10: demonstrate export competitiveness.
Failure to meet agreed targets should trigger the withdrawal of protection. This transforms protectionism from a political favour into an industrial contract between the state and the private sector.
We Should Also Distinguish Between Inputs and Finished Products
This is critical. Ghana should not impose indiscriminate tariffs on everything. If a Ghanaian furniture manufacturer imports machinery, specialised components or production inputs that cannot yet be produced domestically, heavily taxing those imports may actually hurt industrialization.
Instead, the tariff structure should distinguish between productive inputs and finished consumer goods. Importing a machine that allows a Ghanaian factory to produce 100,000 units is economically different from importing 100,000 finished units that compete directly with that factory. Industrial policy must make it cheaper to produce than simply to import and resell.
Ghana Should Use AfCFTA as the Exit Strategy
This is where protectionism connects directly with the broader argument about Ghana’s strategic autonomy. Strategic autonomy does not mean Ghana withdrawing from the world. It means Ghana becoming strong enough to engage the world on better terms. The principle remains:
Work with everybody, but become dependent on nobody.
The economic version of that principle should be: Build for Ghana → Scale for Africa → Compete globally