Iraq's push to bring weapons under state control is running into a question no deadline is likely to settle. Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has given armed factions until June 30, 2027, to complete the process, yet it remains unclear who will decide which forces already belong to the state and which are operating outside the law.
Baghdad counts the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) as part of the state, while Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba and Kata'ib Hezbollah, two of the most powerful factions within the umbrella force, have rejected the government's conditions for disarmament.
Many such actors have justified keeping their arms outside ordinary state control as "resistance" to foreign occupation, a status with no formal standing in Iraqi law. The stakes have also risen in recent weeks. On Nov. 3, reports emerged that Washington had warned Iraq that it could be treated as a state sponsor of terrorism if it fails to meet the 2027 deadline. That leaves the government little time to settle a question its own officials have so far answered only loosely.
A weapon outside the state
The Iraqi government's standing definition of illegal arms appears to be broad. Sabah Al-Numan, who speaks for Zaidi as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, told Amwaj.media that any weapon not under the prime minister's command and outside the official structure of the security and military services is "a weapon outside the state." Light personal firearms held within the law are exempt, he added.
The test turns on command as much as on weapons. A group that hands over its arms while its organizational structures and leadership remain outside the official forces has not complied with the law, Numan argued. Genuine integration, in his account, means "complete absorption" into those forces and cutting organizational and political ties with any non-governmental body.
Numan distinguished the PMU, set up in 2014 to fight the Islamic State group (IS) and made an official body by a 2016 law that placed it under the commander-in-chief, from formations that "possess no legal or constitutional status." PMU spokesman Muhannad Al-Aqabi declined to comment, telling Amwaj.media that the umbrella force had stopped issuing statements on the issue.
Numan's distinction may sit uneasily with his own test, and he did not say directly whether the deadline would reach a faction that is nominally part of the PMU but keeps a separate leadership. Nor did he settle the gap between the government, which presents the deadline as agreed with the factions, and the groups that have declared themselves not bound by any timetable. "The more accurate account is the state's account," he said.
After the June 2027 deadline, Numan warned, armed activity outside the official forces will be dealt with under existing law, including the Anti-Terrorism Law, "regardless of any banners or fictitious labels."
That warning brushed aside "banners" and "labels," yet Numan's answer on who decides whether a faction is "resistance" or outside the law appeared to treat "resistance" as a status the state can confer. The commander-in-chief makes that call in conjunction with the security agencies, he said, while the courts formalize decisions when the law is broken. Numan pointed to no official document setting out these definitions.
A political term
Many factions rest their case for keeping arms on that status, yet Iraqi law makes no provision for it. Critics have long cited Article 9 of the 2005 constitution, which was drafted after the 2003 US-led invasion and bans armed groups outside the armed forces. Wael Munther, a professor of constitutional law at the University of Baghdad, reads the article as setting three tests. A force needs a legal framework for service and discipline, a budget and arsenal under state control, and a place in the chain of command under the constitution's Article 78, which makes the prime minister commander-in-chief.
Munther noted that the 2016 law made the PMU a military formation, but stressed that "no faction operating within the PMU should have an independent command or political leadership outside the scope of the commander-in-chief's orders."
The professor told Amwaj.media that the Anti-Terrorism Law could apply to groups holding weapons outside the umbrella force that refuse to surrender them, while military law would cover a PMU unit that turned its arms on the security forces. Beyond Numan's general reference to the Anti-Terrorism Law, the government has not set out officially how either case would be handled.
Complicating matters is the frequent use of "resistance" in the Iraqi context to describe armed factions operating in a legal gray zone. "Resistance" is "a political term, not a legal one," Munther noted, stating that no authority can confer it, since Iraq is not an occupied country. That reasoning leaves open which law would make armed resistance legal even under occupation.
Several of today's factions fought US forces in the years after the 2003 invasion, and Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq alone claimed more than 6,000 attacks on US-led forces between 2006 and 2011.
Some factions frame resistance as a matter beyond the state's reach. On May 30, Kata'ib Hezbollah security official Abu Mujahid Al-Assaf declared that "jihadist action is today a collective duty." The term "collective duty" comes from Islamic jurisprudence and describes an obligation on the community as a whole that is met if some of its members carry it out. In the same statement, Assaf added that the group would carry it out on behalf of factions that had “abandoned” the responsibility.
No one exempt
The vocabulary of disarmament now runs both ways. Some armed factions have adopted the government's language on keeping weapons in the hands of the state, while official definitions appear to leave room for factions that sit inside the PMU. Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq said in June that it had begun unilaterally separating from the umbrella force, though neither the group nor the government has spelled out what that has actually involved.
Laith Al-Khazali, the brother of the faction's leader, became deputy prime minister on Oct. 15. On Nov. 5, Khazali called confining weapons to the state "a constitutional principle beyond debate."
Hussein Al-Shahmani, the spokesperson for Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq’s political wing, the Sadiqoon bloc, told Amwaj.media that "the decision of war and peace rests with the state and its constitutional institutions." Shahmani separated resistance as a political stance from the use of weapons. No group, "regardless of its sacrifices" in that resistance, may decide alone to use weapons outside the state, he argued.
Shahmani said his party wants the disarmament process to apply to everyone, with a timetable for each force and every weapon registered. The severing of political ties should extend to the PMU, the Counter-Terrorism Service and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga force, he said, so that all follow the commander-in-chief and not "partisan or regional orders."
Kata'ib Hezbollah has gone further, in August listing the Iraqi Kurdish force's dissolution among its conditions for disarmament talks, while Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba asked in June why the pressure to disarm was falling on the weapons of Shiite armed factions, not on the Kurdish Peshmerga.
The holdouts reject both the government's approach and the parliamentary amendments to a new draft PMU law. On Nov. 3, Kata'ib Hezbollah's Assaf denied that the faction would join the government and accused Zaidi's office of tampering with the bill. The following day, Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba rejected those amendments "in their entirety."
The Peshmerga question
Iraqi Kurdish figures have roundly rejected bringing the Peshmerga into the disarmament debate, mainly on constitutional grounds. Farhad Atrushi, deputy speaker of the federal parliament, insisted in late August that the force "existed before the ratification of the Iraqi constitution in 2005" and operates under Article 121, which allows regional governments to establish their own internal security forces, including what it calls the "guards of the region."
In his comments to Amwaj.media, Munther noted that Article 121 has given the Peshmerga a status only a constitutional amendment could remove. For Erbil, the issue is unifying forces that answer to two parties, a process already under way, rather than handing over weapons.
On Sept. 21, the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs completed a reorganization of its forces into 11 divisions, a step toward merging units long tied to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
Munther told Amwaj.media that he expects any new law to regulate the surrender of weapons already banned under existing legislation. A challenge to such a law before the Federal Supreme Court could backfire on those bringing it, he warned. The top court would then examine Article 9, and the case could turn to the legality of all armed groups acting outside the state’s command and control structure. Zaidi ordered a draft law on state control of weapons in August, but no text has so far appeared.
One deadline has already slipped. Zaidi had set the end of September for factions to integrate before pushing it back to June 2027 later that month. The test is whether the rules apply to all, and whether state institutions end up controlling not only the weapons but also the command of the fighters who carry them and the decision to use force.