Iraqi Kurdistan's revived regional legislature has raised the specter of its two ruling parties going their separate ways again, two decades after merging rival administrations. After the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) pushed the Kurdistan Parliament back into session on Nov. 4, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani announced the next day, in a fiery video message, that his side was quitting the Kurdistan region’s government and did not recognize its legislature.
Two Kurdish legal experts, who asked not to be named because the matter is before Iraq's Federal Supreme Court, told Amwaj.media the parliamentary session was valid, since the quorum was met.
Yet the legality of the session does not appear to be the primary issue. The real contest is over whether the KDP can turn its electoral lead into control of the next regional administration, and what it would cost the PUK to stop it. Talabani’s leverage lies less in the chamber in Erbil than in the Khor Mor gas field inside his party’s zone of influence, and in his ties to the Shiite parties that lead the ruling coalition in Baghdad. Whether Iraqi Kurdistan remains as one entity may therefore be settled around Khor Mor and in Baghdad as much as in the Kurdistan Parliament.
Power-sharing breakdown
The Kurdistan Parliament’s Nov. 4 session, the chamber's first in two years, drew 52 of its 100 lawmakers. Besides the KDP's members, those in attendance included three minority quota representatives and allies from two smaller parties. In addition, there were a total of eight defectors from the PUK, the opposition Halwest (National Stance) movement and the New Generation Movement (NGM). With a quorum reached, the KDP's Vala Fareed was elected speaker, Ramy Noori of the Christian quota as deputy speaker and Turkmen member Muna Kahveci as secretary.
The boycotting parties rejected the session's legitimacy, and on Nov. 10 the PUK and the New Generation Movement filed a joint challenge at Iraq's Federal Supreme Court seeking to annul it. The same day, Rizgar Haji Hama, a member of the PUK's political bureau, told the party's Channel 8 that legal action had begun against three of its lawmakers who attended the session and that complaints would go to the electoral commission. On Nov. 15, the court rejected the request to suspend the regional parliament while it hears the case, leaving the main challenge pending.
The confrontation turns on how power is divided in the next Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KDP won 39 seats in the 2024 Kurdistan Parliament elections and has since insisted that the next cabinet reflect that lead. The PUK, with 23 seats, wants to keep the power-sharing model that has held since the mid-2000s, which recognizes its hold over the Halabja and Sulaimaniyah Governorates.
The PUK's hand grew stronger in July, when it announced an alliance with NGM, whose 15 seats gave the partners 38, one fewer than the KDP. The KDP has called the deal the "prison agreement," because it was signed days after NGM leader Shaswar Abdulwahid was released from jail in Sulaimaniyah, and the partners have acted together since—from the boycott to the court challenge.
The session's timing matters too. It came six weeks before Dec. 14, the date to which the Federal Supreme Court on Oct. 26 postponed an opposition lawsuit that seeks to classify the KRG as a caretaker government. Before the court rules, a working parliament could give the KDP legislative cover for decisions taken since the 2024 regional legislative elections. It could also give the Kurdistan region’s president legal grounds to task KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani with forming a new government without fresh polls, an outcome the PUK strongly opposes.
In his Nov. 5 video message, issued after a meeting of the PUK leadership, Talabani accused the KDP of using its money "to buy members of parliament." The PUK leader withdrew his party from the outgoing KRG cabinet, said it would not recognize "any government or position that comes out of this" and threatened to appoint a rival Kurdistan region president, ministers and prime minister if the KDP named its own.
The dispute has revived fears of a return to the 1990s, when the two parties fought a civil war. The rivals ran separate administrations based in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah until a merger in 2006.
"Both parties realize the serious implications of violent clashes for the stability of the region as well as for their own political and economic power," Zmkan Ali, a senior researcher at the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani, told Amwaj.media. The researcher cautioned that the risk of violence remains, since "the two parties are heavily armed, and the political atmosphere is charged."
Energy as leverage?
The PUK's strongest card may be the ground it holds. The Khor Mor gas field lies in Chamchamal district, on the road between Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyah. The area is on the western edge of the PUK's zone of influence, close to the territories disputed between Baghdad and Erbil which federal forces retook after the Oct. 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. The field fuels more than 80% of the Kurdistan region's electricity generation, its operators say, and its gas supplies power stations in the KDP's strongholds of Duhok and Erbil.
That position has been used before. In 2022, the PUK blocked pipeline work toward Erbil by KAR Group, a KDP-linked firm, after Talabani complained the contract had been awarded without a tender. After the Nov. 4 session, PUK-aligned security forces expelled KAR Group employees from the area around the field, according to Iraq Oil Report, which on Nov. 7 read the move as a sign the party was willing to use its control of the gas-rich territory as leverage.
The field has also proved vulnerable. A suspected drone attack on Nov. 8 halted production and cut about 2.8 gigawatts of generating capacity, according to the KRG's electricity ministry. By Nov. 13, the ministry said, restored supply covered only 40% of the Kurdistan region's demand. Dana Gas, the field's joint operator, said on Nov. 14 that the facility had sustained major damage and still could not produce any gas.
The blackout has handed Baghdad a role of its own. On Nov. 9, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi ordered the federal oil ministry to supply the Kurdistan region's household gas until the field resumes production. Against this backdrop, the KDP may be able to form a government without the PUK, but it cannot easily keep its cities lit without Chamchamal.
Baghdad as broker
Amid intensifying Kurdish infighting, the battleground has quickly shifted to the federal capital. On Nov. 12 and 13, Abdulwahid and Talabani traveled together to Baghdad and met Hikmah Movement leader Ammar Al-Hakim, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq head Humam Hamoudi, former prime ministers Nouri Al-Maliki (2006-14) and Muhammad Shia' Al-Sudani (2022-26) as well as Abu Ala Al-Walai, who leads the Shiite armed faction Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada. Most belong to the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, whose backing would matter for any arrangement that runs through the federal government.
Hakim urged his Kurdish guests to settle the Kurdistan region's disputes through dialogue. PUK official Berhan Sheikh Rauf told the news site Ultra Iraq that the talks covered the federal budget and the KRG's share of it. Meanwhile, an unnamed NGM source told the same outlet that leaders in Baghdad had also discussed mediating an end to the Kurdistan Parliament crisis.
The question now is whether the PUK will bypass Erbil and deal with Baghdad directly. Talabani told a forum in Sulaimaniyah on Nov. 12 that Iraqi Kurdistan was already living "the reality of two governments and two administrations." Another PUK official, who asked not to be named, told Amwaj.media, "The PUK will pursue every possible avenue to serve the people of this area."
Kurdistan Watch on Nov. 13 reported that the PUK is seeking salaries for its zone of influence directly from the federal government. It also pointed to a drive by civil society groups in Sulaimaniyah to seek signatures for a referendum on the formation of a separate region. Under Article 119 of Iraq's constitution, one-tenth of a governorate's voters can request a referendum on forming a region, although the article does not address a governorate that already belongs to a region.
Such a split would meet resistance in Erbil. On Nov. 15, Barzani pledged to stand against attempts to divide the Kurdistan region.
A return to two Kurdish-led administrations is not inevitable. Shivan Fazil, a doctoral student in political science at Boston University, told Amwaj.media he doubted the rivalry would lead to a formal split, since the PUK could still join a coalition government if the two sides agree on key ministries. A separate Sulaimaniyah-based administration would also need Baghdad's approval and budget allocations, Fazil noted. The academic added that the federal government, Iran and Turkiye may all oppose it for fear of encouraging pro-autonomy movements elsewhere. Tehran has reportedly made its view known.
On Nov. 14, Mohammad Haji Mahmoud, secretary of the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party—a KDP ally—said a visiting Iranian delegation had conveyed opposition to any attempt to divide Iraqi Kurdistan into two administrations. Another legal expert, Farman Hassan, told Amwaj.media that the Iraqi constitution recognizes the Kurdistan region as a single entity, so any attempt to divide it would face strict constitutional barriers.
That appears to leave the PUK with more to gain from exercising leverage from the specter of the party going its own way than a formal break. Whether the crisis over the Kurdistan Parliament stays a political standoff or hardens into a lasting division will depend on whether the Kurdish ruling parties return to negotiations. Iraqi Kurdistan again has a working parliament, but the chamber's revival may mark the start of a deeper split rather than a recovery.