In Iraq, Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has reportedly given Kata'ib Hezbollah until the end of this week to hand over its Jurf Al-Sakhar base to government forces. The Shiite armed faction has held the site, located south of Baghdad, since it was liberated from the Islamic State group (IS) in 2014. The state has since been barred from entering. The surrounding town’s mostly Sunni residents, who fled during the fighting, have not been allowed back either. Amid the standoff, who is talking to Kata’ib Hezbollah, and on whose behalf?
The answer seems to run through a crowded field of mediators, messengers and back channels, from a committee of the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, to businessmen, tribal elders, security officers and brokers in Tehran.
Having said that, one source in the Prime Minister’s Office suggested to Amwaj.media that the overlapping channels serve less to strike a deal than to keep the talks from collapsing. However, reports point to an emerging agreement for other members of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) to take over Jurf Al-Sakhar.
Between mediation and mandate
The most official of the channels to Kata’ib Hezbollah is a committee of the ruling Coordination Framework, announced in mid-August to lead talks with armed factions that refuse to hand over their weapons. The committee is overall tasked with easing tensions between Zaidi and such actors. Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi Al-Ameri and Hikmah Movement leader Ammar Al-Hakim were among its first members, and later reports also named former prime ministers Nouri Al-Maliki (2006-14) and Muhammad Shia' Al-Sudani (2022-26).
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leader Humam Hamoudi had joined the committee by early November. A source from the Coordination Framework’s leadership told Amwaj.media that Maliki stepped back without leaving the task force, backing Hamoudi as a trusted stand-in who would support him. The same source said Hakim was brought in as a consensus figure. The Hikmah Movement leader is seen as a mediator who can soften positions when the alliance's leaders clash over disarmament, and can pass low-priority messages to some Iraqi figures in the Iran-backed 'Axis of Resistance' through his family and financial ties.
Indeed, as tension between Zaidi and Kata'ib Hezbollah mounted over Jurf Al-Sakhar, Hakim and Hamoudi on Nov. 8 reportedly began an urgent mediation between the two sides.
The Coordination Framework source also said that Hamoudi's role in mediating between Zaidi's government and Shiite armed factions is more substantive than Hakim's. The ISCI leader takes part in meetings with the heads of ‘resistance’ groups and relays their responses to the ruling alliance's senior figures. At the same time, one senior figure in Abshir Ya Iraq—the electoral list Hamoudi leads—cautioned Amwaj.media that the ISCI leader has no blank check to negotiate, sign or commit to any arrangement.
The heavyweight link
Ameri is the mediation committee's heavyweight, and getting the whole Coordination Framework behind any deal means bringing the Badr Organization chief onside. An advisor to the ruling alliance said Shiite political leaders know how much sway Ameri holds over the decisions of armed groups, and consult him on every step they take toward the factions.
The source in the Prime Minister's Office told Amwaj.media that Ameri has helped calm the mounting tensions over Jurf Al-Sakhar, using his contacts with Kata'ib Hezbollah's leaders to clear the way for an inspection team to enter the town. The terms of the team’s Nov. 13 visit were separately settled in an understanding between Zaidi and PMU Chief of Staff Abdulaziz (Abu Fadak) Al-Muhammadawi.
Ameri and Zaidi have been at loggerheads before. At an Aug. 5 meeting of the State Administration Coalition, a wider constellation that governs Iraq, Ameri allegedly told the prime minister that decisions on disarmament belonged to the coalition's leaders, and not to Zaidi alone. A Nov. 3 report named Ameri among several committee members who had objected to the prime minister’s direct involvement in the talks.
Notably, the Badr Organization is both a force within the PMU and a member of the Coordination Framework, so its veteran secretary-general sits between Iraq’s armed factions and the government. A senior source in Ameri’s office told Amwaj.media that the Badr Organization chief believes an immediate, comprehensive handover of Jurf Al-Sakhar could set off a confrontation that would be hard to contain, so he favors a gradual approach. The source also suggested that Ameri wants a state that absorbs Shiite armed factions, yet allows such actors to keep their political and military standing.
Channels beyond the committee
The source in the Prime Minister’s Office said Zaidi has inherited from his predecessor, Sudani, a network of economic, tribal and security channels that can be leveraged to engage with Iraq’s armed factions. All are now, in the view of the source, being mobilized in the standoff with Kata’ib Hezbollah.
Zaidi is said to prefer these channels to the Coordination Framework committee, the source in the Prime Minister’s Office explained, saying that the prime minister believes the factions are granted too much leverage in return for weak commitments. The economic channel runs through companies with interests on both sides, some of which broker calm unprompted because escalation would hurt their business.
The government has pressed some of those companies, using their role in financing the factions as leverage to secure their help in de-escalation in return for keeping investigations into them closed, the same source charged. The current escalation has sidelined many of these companies and put others under direct pressure, as part of a wider push to curb the factions' economic influence, the source added.
On Nov. 5, Zaidi directed the Military Industrialization Authority, the state body that makes weapons and ammunition for Iraq's security forces, to deal only with manufacturers and never through intermediary companies. The government presented the order as a step against corruption in arms contracts, and it shuts out the kind of intermediary firm the source in the Prime Minister’s Office described.
Tribal channels, particularly those with ties inside the PMU and the factions in Babil, Dhi Qar and Maysan Governorates, offer members of Shiite armed groups guarantees against prosecution, a security advisor in the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces told Amwaj.media. Security channels run through senior officers in the Army Chief of Staff's office, the Joint Operations Command and the PMU, who do not negotiate but pass messages between the two sides, the same source said.
The Iranian channel
One diplomatic source close to the prime minister told Amwaj.media that during his unannounced visit to Tehran on Nov. 6, Zaidi asked Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf to persuade Iran-backed armed factions to cooperate, to ease US pressure on Baghdad. The same source said Zaidi later repeated the request, prior to the Nov. 13 inspection of Jurf Al-Sakhar, to secure Kata'ib Hezbollah's agreement to it.
On Nov. 11, a Shiite politician close to the Coordination Framework reportedly linked the trip to US demands, saying it was also meant to persuade Tehran to keep Iraqi factions out of any coming confrontation.
Qalibaf had reportedly intervened once before, during a trip to Baghdad in mid-August, to soften the prime minister’s position on enforcing the Sept. 30 deadline for disarming ‘resistance’ factions. The following month, Zaidi appears to have acquiesced by extending the deadline for bringing all weapons under state control to June 30, 2027.
Officially, Baghdad denies any such role for Tehran. On Nov. 15, government spokesman Haidar Al-Aboudi said there was "no Iranian interference through communication channels or mediation" and that dealing with Jurf Al-Sakhar was an Iraqi responsibility.
The following evening, Esmail Qa’ani, commander of the Quds Force—the foreign operations arm of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—arrived in Baghdad. Coordination Framework sources speaking to Al-Hurra claimed that Qa’ani and Zaidi agreed that Kata'ib Hezbollah would leave the disputed town "soon," with other PMU brigades and security forces filling the vacuum.
Other reports say Zaidi refused to meet Qa’ani and told mediators that the decision to send government forces into Jurf Al-Sakhar was final, while Ameri, Hamoudi and other Coordination Framework leaders warned the premier against intra-Shiite bloodshed. On Nov. 17, a Kata'ib Hezbollah leader insisted the group would not withdraw.
On Nov. 18, a security committee chaired by Zaidi decided that the Energy Police would take over guarding the pipeline through Jurf Al-Sakhar and that the force holding the town would be replaced. On Nov. 9, a source reportedly accused Kata’ib Hezbollah of tapping the area’s oil pipelines. An unconfirmed deployment plan would split the town between the Iraqi Army, federal police and two PMU brigades. Coordination Framework leaders had reportedly vetoed sending in combat troops at a Nov. 16 meeting, agreeing instead to replace the force holding the town with other PMU units.
All in all, despite the many informal channels between Zaidi and Iraq’s Iran-backed armed factions, it remains unclear whether a comprehensive deal will emerge. If Kata’ib Hezbollah does leave Jurf Al-Sakhar by Zaidi’s deadline later this week, that will likely be only the start of wider and more contested negotiations over the powerful armed faction’s future.