As an immediate neighbor of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran has significant political, economic and security stakes in the armed confrontation to its east.

Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif declared “open war” on the Taliban government in Kabul on Feb. 27, and the conflict remains unresolved. Tehran fears that continued fighting could fuel unrest in its restive Sistan-Baluchestan Province, giving armed groups room to expand their activities and disrupting vital trade and transit routes.

Tehran has avoided taking sides, putting regional stability first. Its overriding interest is to see the conflict end as quickly as possible and to keep it from developing into a broader security and geopolitical challenge along its eastern borders. Beyond the threat of militancy at home, a prolonged war could disrupt cross-border commerce and send new waves of refugees into an already vulnerable Islamic Republic.

These concerns have grown more urgent since the Israeli-US war on Iran began on Feb. 28. Already under enormous military, economic and diplomatic pressure, Tehran has little appetite for more instability or a humanitarian crisis on its eastern flank.

Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University in Qatar, told Amwaj.media that “instability on Iran’s eastern borders is not something that Tehran wants to worry about now as all its concentration needs to be on the US-Israeli war on the country.”


Yet Fatemeh Aman, a US-based Iran analyst, cautions against reading Iran’s position purely through the prism of its war with Israel and the United States. “Tehran has had serious concerns about security along its eastern borders for decades,” she told Amwaj.media, adding that “these concerns are not new, although the war has certainly made them more urgent.”

Balancing Islamabad and Kabul

Pakistan shares a border and a host of economic and security interests with Iran. Islamabad also matters to Tehran geopolitically, chiefly as a diplomatic bridge to Washington. It brokered the informal Iran-US ceasefire that went into effect on Apr. 8 and in the immediate aftermath hosted high-level talks between the two sides in Islamabad.

At the same time, Iran has expanded its political, commercial and security ties with Afghanistan’s de facto government since the Taliban returned to power in Aug. 2021, despite tensions over water rights, refugees and the border.

Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told Amwaj.media that Tehran has kept up relations with both the Taliban and their domestic opponents to retain influence with every major player in Afghan politics. That pragmatism serves Iran at a time when it worries that other regional powers, such as Gulf Cooperation Council members could end up “monopolizing power” over the Taliban.

“Tehran has sought to establish communication channels and strengthen relations with certain Taliban factions,” Heiran-Nia said. “In order to prevent the group from becoming exclusively dependent on Iran’s regional rivals.” The aim, he added, is to preserve Iran’s own stake in Afghanistan’s balance of power.

Fear of spillover

Tehran is particularly worried that violence could spill into its eastern border regions. Sistan-Baluchestan Province has long struggled with underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, smuggling, militancy and the political marginalization of its largely Sunni Baluch population.

Iranian authorities are watching the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Pakistan, Jaish Ul-Adl in southeastern Iran and Islamic State-Khorasan in Afghanistan.

The Jan. 2024 exchange of cross-border missile strikes between Iran and Pakistan showed how quickly a security crisis can inflame regional frictions. After a series of deadly militant attacks, Iran first hit what it said were Jaish Ul-Adl targets inside Pakistan. Two days later, Islamabad retaliated with strikes inside Iran that it claimed were associated with Pakistani members of the BLA. Ultimately, tension was promptly de-escalated, with the narrative that each side had only targeted its own citizens.

Trade raises the stakes further. Tehran sees stable relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan as essential to its commerce across Central and South Asia, and to a wider strategy of diversifying trade routes and weathering western sanctions. Continued fighting between Islamabad and Kabul could badly disrupt those links.

The India factor

India adds another variable to an already complex equation. New Delhi has pursued rapprochement with the Taliban, especially since the flare-up in Afghan-Pakistani tension over the past year. In Oct. 2025, the Taliban’s acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, held talks in New Delhi with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, and India announced it was upgrading its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy.

India now appears to be gaining some influence in Afghanistan. That has worried officials in Islamabad, who fear an Afghan-Indian partnership could reshape the geopolitics of South Asia against Pakistan.

Aman noted that Iran has longstanding relations with India, which “has been expanding its engagement with the Taliban.” She added, “Pakistan is naturally suspicious of India’s growing presence in Afghanistan. So, Tehran has to take these competing relationships into account.”

The limits of mediation

Iran has backed both regional and international efforts to de-escalate the conflict between Pakistan and the Taliban. It offered to mediate between the two sides in Nov. 2025, an initiative which Islamabad welcomed. “Pakistan has always favored resolving issues through dialogue and diplomacy, and we appreciate Iran’s offer of mediation,” said Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson Tahir Hussain Andrabi.

Tehran then held consultations with Ankara, Doha, Moscow and other capitals. Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council at the time, told Pakistani leaders that Tehran was ready to help resolve the tensions with Afghan leaders. In February this year, when the crisis escalated into “open war,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi renewed Tehran’s offer to facilitate dialogue.

Neither initiative produced a sustained diplomatic process, let alone a settlement. Heiran-Nia suggested that Tehran’s increasingly cautious diplomatic language shows it wants to be involved without being held responsible if mediation fails.

Iran’s approach reflects its desire to contain the war between its two eastern neighbors. Instability spilling from Afghanistan or Pakistan into eastern Iran would threaten Tehran’s interests, as would anything that stops it from balancing its relations with Islamabad and Kabul.

Iran’s emphasis on the need for diplomacy shows how much Tehran desires an end to these hostilities. Yet the serious domestic and international challenges Iran faces sharply limit its ability to influence the course of the war.

Ultimately, Iran wants Afghanistan and Pakistan to negotiate a settlement that lets Islamabad and Kabul address their differences without a war that threatens the security of Iran and the wider region. Unfortunately for Iran, and even more so for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, that outcome appears nowhere on the horizon.